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Ayelet Shachar, The BirthrightLottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard
U. Press 2009). Pp. 273. $39.95.
Deborah Hellman, When Is DiscriminationWrong? (Harvard U. Press 2008). Pp. 205.
$41.50.
One of the paradoxes of the second half of the twentieth century is that despite
advances in human and civil rights laws, the gap between the "haves" and the "have
nots" continues to expand. In the United States, Supreme Court decisions and federal
statutes established that racial segregation and gender discrimination are now illegal.I
One would expect to see material improvements in the lives of women and people of
color of both genders. Yet the gap between the wealth of people of color and whites has
widened, 2 and the gender pay gap remains the same as it was in 1970.3 Internationally,
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains protections against
discrimination and guarantees of basic economic benefits. 4 Even though developed
nations act upon this commitment by providing foreign aid and other assistance, the gap
between the standard of living in developed and underdeveloped nations is still
* Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. Thanks to
Wyatt Holliday for his excellent research assistance.
1. See e.g. Frontierov. Richardson,411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex discrimination violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race segregation in public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1964) (prohibiting recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the
basis of race); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1964) (prohibiting
employers from discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender and religion); 1972 Education
Amendments, 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1972) (prohibiting educational facilities that receive federal funds from
discriminating on the basis of sex).
2. Thomas Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede & Laura Sullivan, The Racial Wealth Gap Increases Fourfold (Inst.

on Assets and Soc. Policy 2010) (available at http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/Racial-Wealth-Gap-Brief.pdf)
(reporting that the wealth gap between whites and African Americans increased from $20,000 in 1984 to
$95,000 in 2007); Rakesh Kochhar, The Wealth of Hispanic Households: 1996 to 2002 (Pew Hispanic Ctr.

2004) (available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf) (asserting the net worth of Hispanic households
relative to white households has dropped from 9.2% in 1996 to 8.9% in 2002).
3.

Robert

Longley,

Pay

Gap

Widening,

Census

Data

Shows,

http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/censusandstatistics/a/paygapgrows.htm (last accessed Sept. 24, 2010).
4. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, GA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN
Doc. A/810 (1948).
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staggering. 5 The contrast between ideals and reality casts doubt on the extent to which
law can remedy deeply entrenched societal inequality. At the very least, this paradox
suggests flaws in the paradigms which shape our human and civil rights law. This review
discusses three books which critically analyze the basic concepts underlying these laws,
and outlines reforms to make them more effective for addressing inequality both
domestically and internationally. In When Is Discrimination Wrong, Deborah Hellman
examines the premises underlying United States antidiscrimination law and suggests a
new way of thinking about discrimination that would more effectively address the harm
targeted by antidiscrimination measures such as the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.6 In Gender Equality:
Dimensions of Women 's Equal Citizenship, the authors suggest an alternative paradigm

for equality law, the rights of citizenship, and argue that citizenship provides a basis for
addressing root causes of women's inequality, including gender motivated violence and
economic disempowerment. 7 In The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global

Inequality, Ayelet Shachar points out that citizenship can substantially limit rights by
drawing lines of exclusion. Shachar argues that birthright citizenship contributes to both
global inequality and inequality within the domestic realm. These provocative, eyeopening works are important additions to the ongoing debate over reformulating equality
law in the twenty-first century. 9
In When Is Discrimination Wrong, Deborah Hellman examines United States

antidiscrimination practices to determine when differentiating based on traits is morally
and legally culpable, and therefore subject to legal sanctions. 10 Hellman advocates the
principle that "all people are equally important from the moral point of view and so are
equally worthy of concern and respect."l l According to Hellman, differentiation
becomes discrimination when that differentiation demeans another person by treating
another person as if he was not of equal moral worth.12 The book describes Hellman's
theory of how law should go about determining whether a person has been demeaned,
and is therefore a target of unlawful discrimination.
United States antidiscrimination law focuses either on the intent of the actor 1 3 or
the harm caused by the action.14 Hellman's theory shifts the focus away from intent and
5.

See Ayelet Shachar, The BirthrightLottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality 24-27 (Harvard U. Press

2009).
6. See Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong? (Harvard U. Press 2008).
7. See Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L.

Grossman eds., Cambridge U. Press 2009).
8. See Shachar,supra n. 5.
9. See e.g. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 2001 (1996); Erin R. Melnick, Reaffirming No-Fault Divorce: Supplementing FormalEquality
with Substantive Change, 75 Ind. L.J. 711 (2000); Mary Romero, Bursting the Foundational Myths of
Reproductive Labor under Capitalism: A Call for Brave New Families or Brave New Villages? 8 Am. U. J.

Gender Soc. Policy & L. 177 (2000).
10. Hellman, supra n. 6, at 2-3.
11. Id. at 6.
12. Id. at 40.

13. Discriminatory intent is required to prove race or sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Hellman, supra n. 6, at
139.
14. Discriminatory impact may be sufficient to prove a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
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impact. She argues that discrimination should be illegal regardless of whether it was
intended, and even if the harm would have occurred absent the discrimination. 15 The
touchstone of Hellman's approach to discrimination is respect for human dignity. Thus,
she is influenced by rights concepts from international law and the recently adopted
Canadian Charter of Rights, which establishes an enforceable right to human dignity.16
Context and culture are important to determining whether a person's action is
demeaning. 17 Most importantly, a person can only demean another person if he exercises
power or influence over her. 18 Hellman's approach is deep and methodical. Her theory is
both sensible and sensitive to how discrimination operates in the real world.
Hellman effectively critiques the alternatives to her approach. Relying on "merit"
to make decisions can simply perpetuate the unjust status quo, since merit is defined by
individual employers and other decision makers to conform to their own expectation
about the parameters of the job. 19 Relying on accuracy and rationality is problematic
because many non-moral decisions are accurate, and too many accurate decisions are not
moral.20 As our current discrimination law recognizes, generalizations linking
characteristics to certain traits are often accurate, but just as often the basis for
discrimination.21 Like Catharine MacKinnon and Charles Lawrence,22 Hellman argues
that discrimination is wrong whenever it happens, regardless of whether the actor
intended to discriminate. Given the pervasive nature of unconscious bias in our culture,
23
the requirement of conscious intent masks a great deal of discrimination in our society.
Hellman is correct when she argues that the real policy is most apparent in the
discriminatory results of a policy.24 As she argues, "[t]o determine what the real rule is
we need to know whether race was a factor, not whether the employer intended race to
be a factor." 25 Of course, the challenge is determining whether bias affected a decision
when it should not have. 26
Hellman is effective at unpacking the reasons why we have antidiscrimination law,
and in critiquing our law's approach to discrimination. The problem is the lack of
neutrality in the liberal states. Her theory begs the question of how to effectively
implement her "demeaning" test. In one of the most effective chapters of the book,
Hellman explains that merit cannot justify discriminatory action because merit itself is
See Griggs v. Duke Power, 410 U.S. 424,431-432 (1971).

15. Hellman, supra n. 6, at 18, 139.
16. Id. at 51.
17. Id at 25.

18. Id at 35.
19. A good example of this is when a male employer believes that doing a good job entails working late
hours in the office, a difficult task for employees who are primary caretakers of their children. See id. at 111.
(citing Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Familyand Work Conflict and What to Do about It (Oxford U.

Press 2000)).
20. Hellman, supra n. 6, at 115.
21. See id. at 118-119 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690) (stating administrative convenience does not
justify differentiating on the basis of sex because of the danger that this will lead to decision making based on
stereotypes).
22. See id. at 55 (acknowledging the influence).
23. Id at 141-142.
24. Id. at 149.
25. Hellman, supra n. 6, at 150.
26. Id at 155.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009

3

LA 45
WREVIEW
TULSA Vol.
Tulsa Law Review,
[2009], Iss. 4, Art. 28

866

[Vol. 45:863

not neutral but socially constructed.27 Unfortunately, Hellman does not follow this point
to its logical conclusion, which is to question the neutrality of decision makers. She does
not adequately account for the fact that the decision makers that would apply her
"demeaning" test would represent precisely those powerful actors who have not
themselves suffered from being demeaned by others. Hellman admits that "if what is objectively - demeaning is Oust) what the majority thinks is demeaning, this standard is
likely to reproduce the oppression of minorities." 2 8 She believes that the "modest
objectivity" of the decision maker will solve this dilemma. I am concerned, despite
Hellman's protests to the contrary,30 that the "demeaning" test invites the sort of
subjectivity that is harmful to members of groups that have historically lacked power,
who are exactly the people that are most likely to be plaintiffs in discrimination suits. If
the test for evaluating discrimination becomes even more subjective, those plaintiffs are
even more likely to lose, however valid their claims may be.
The book Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Equal Citizenship, edited by

Joanna Grossman and Linda McClain, also explores antidiscrimination law. 3 1 Instead of
attempting to fix the prevailing, Equal Protection based approach as Hellman does, this
book presents an alternative paradigm for women's rights, that of equal citizenship. 32
The book starts by recognizing that advances in women's equality in the last fifty years,
while significant, have also been limited. 3 3 The gender gap still plagues women who
work outside the home, 3 4 and statistics of household income after divorce reveal that
women as a class remain economically vulnerable. 3 5 Domestic violence plagues the lives
of women in almost epidemic proportions,36 and women still lack full autonomy over
their reproductive choices.37 Women are still far more likely than men to be the primary
caretakers of their children, and this impacts their ability to succeed in the workplace.38
The essays in Gender Equality ask the reader to consider legal issues confronting women
not just as a question of equal treatment between men and women. Instead, the authors
argue that women are entitled to essential positive rights that are necessary to enable the
belonging of women as full citizens in our society.
The rhetoric of second class citizenship has served as a rallying cry for rights
movements, including those who have advocated for women's equality, throughout our
27. Id. at 93-113.
28. Id. at 72.
29. See id. at 75.

30. See Hellman, supra n. 6, at 79-80 (arguing that it is not particularly hard to be objective in determining
whether a practice demeans another person).
31. See generally Gender Equality, supra n. 7.
32. See generally id
33. See id. at 1-13.
34. Robert Longley, About.com, US Government Info, Why Women Still Make Less Than Men,

http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/censusandstatistics/a/paygapgrows.htm (last accessed Oct. 14, 2010).
35. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Child Support Is Not the Answer: The Nature of Dependencies and
Welfare Reform, in Child Support: The Next Frontier209 (3. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S. Melli eds., U.

Mich. Press 2000).
36.

See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and FeministLawmaking (Yale U. Press 2000).

37. See e.g. Gonzalez v. Carhart,550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding restrictions on abortion rights).
38. See Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women 's Cultural
Caregiving, and the Limits ofEconomic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 371 (2001).
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history. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the attempts of advocates to
frame rights claims as rights of citizenship.40 Instead, gender equality is a matter of equal
protection law. 4 1 In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted several statutes intended to
further women's equality,42 and, since 1971, the Court has held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits classifications based on gender stereotypes. 43 While this is indeed
progress, several major problems exist within this paradigm that have limited this
progress. The Equal Protection Clause only prohibits policies that intentionally
discriminate on the basis of gender,44 and does not require the state to take affirmative
measures to eliminate barriers to equality. 4 5 Moreover, the Court has held that the
government has no obligation to protect women, not only from private discrimination,
but even from private violence. 4 6 Thus, the equal protection based approach is
inadequate to address many of the most deeply rooted problems of women in our society,
including violence, poverty, and the lack of adequate representation in the power
structure of government and the private sector. Many of the worse problems experienced
by women, discussed in this book, simply do not fit the equal protection paradigm
because they are experienced primarily, or even exclusively, by women. For example,
the fact that domestic violence is experienced primarily by women is a manifestation of
women's subordination in our society, but treating male and female victims the same
will not eradicate this problem. Another obvious example is the fact that only women
bear the burden of childbearing and childbirth, and there is simply no analogous
condition experienced by men.47
Gender Equality presents another way to think about women's inequality and
addresses the barriers to women's full realization as members in our society. The rights
of citizenship arguably entail a set of prerequisites for belonging in society, and thus
provide a basis to advocate for a more substantive vision of women's equality. As
McClain and Grossman explain in their introduction, "[t]his conception includes the
complete rights, benefits, duties, and obligations that members of any society expect to
share and aspires to goals of inclusion, belonging, participation, and civic
membership." 4 8 The essays in the book present a multifaceted view of citizenship, from
the role that citizenship plays in women's political empowerment 49 to the relevance of
39. See generally Gretchen Ritter, Women's Civic Inclusion and the Bill of Rights, in Gender Equality,
supra n. 7, at 61.

40. See e.g. Bradwell v. Ill., 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1872) (rejecting the claim that the right to practice law is a
privilege or immunity of citizenship).
41. See e.g. U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 532-534 (1996).

42. See e.g. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§2000d-2000d-7 (1994)); Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (2006).
43.
44.
45.
46.

See e.g. Frontiero,411 U.S. 677; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See PersonnelAdminstr. Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277 (1979)
See e.g. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).

47. Feminists have long debated how the equality paradigm should address the fact that women are far
more likely than men to do the work associated with raising children, and thus far more likely to experience a
negative impact on their career success and earning potential. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Canon, in
Legal Canons 266 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., N.Y.U. Press 2000).
48. Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 2.
49. See Kathryn Abrams, Women and Antiwar Protest: Rearticulating Gender and Citizenship, in Gender
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citizenship to what are traditionally considered to be "private" issues, including women's
sexuality and reproductive rights and the impact of domestic violence on women's
ability to exercise their rights as citizens.50 Gender Equality also explores the
significance of citizenship rights in the international sphere and with regard to
immigration laws,51and the relationship between those rights and social and cultural
norms, both domestically and internationally.52 Finally, the book explores social
citizenship as a source of the economic rights that women need to participate as full
citizens in our society. 53
Gender Equality is a diffuse group of essays, but they contain several discernible
themes. First, the problems identified in this book are not caused by intentional
discrimination. Instead, the book focuses on issues of deeply embedded inequality,
primarily based on social customs and practices that are not intentionally discriminatory.
Second, while the government plays a role in creating the unequal conditions, by and
large those conditions are not caused by state action. Third, the authors are calling for
affirmative measures to remedy this inequality and substantive rights that go well beyond
equal treatment. Finally, many of the issues discussed in this book are experienced either
entirely or primarily by women, with no comparable corollary experienced by men.
Gender Equality is more ambivalent about the effectiveness of liberal individualism as a
paradigm for women's rights. As illustrated by a number of these essays, individual
autonomy has always been a goal of feminists. Under common law tradition, we did not
have an identity of our own. 54 Instead, our legal identity was subsumed in that of our
husbands. 5 5 So much of the activism of women's rights advocates over the years has
been targeted at achieving independence from our husbands and fathers (hence the term

Equality, supra n. 7, at 131; Eileen McDonagh, Citizenship and Women's Election to Political Office: The
Power of Gendered Public Policies, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 201; Anne Peters & Stefan Suter,
Representation, Discrimination,and Democracy: A Legal Assessment of Gender Quotas in Politics, in Gender
Equality, supra n. 7, at 174.
50. See Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: Freedom, Vibrators, and Belonging, in Gender Equality, supra
n. 7, at 289; Maxine Eichner, Feminism, Queer Theory, and Sexual Citizenship, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7,
at 307; Nancy J. Hirschmann, Stem Cells, Disability,and Abortion: A Feminist Approach to Equal Citizenship,
in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 154; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Domestic Violence, Citizenship, and Equality,
in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 378; Mary Lyndon Shaney, Infertility, Social Justice,and Equal Citizenship,
in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 327; Barbara Stark, Reproductive Rights and the Reproduction of Gender, in
Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 345.
51. Kerry Abrams, Becoming a Citizen: Marriage, Immigration, and Assimilation, in Gender Equality,
supra n. 7, at 39; Regina Austin, Women's Unequal Citizenship at the Border: Lessons from Three Nonfiction
Films about the Women of Juarez, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 359; Anisseh Van Engeland-Nourai, On
the Path to Equal Citizenship and Gender Equality: Political,Judicial, and Legal Empowerment of Muslim
Women, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 390; Deborah Weissman, Gender and Human Rights: Between
Morals and Politics, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 409.
52. See Beverly Baines, Must Feminists Indentify As Secular Citizens? Lessons from Ontario, in Gender
Equality, supra n. 7, at 83; Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism and Constitutional Citizenship, in
Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 107.
53. See Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy and Social Citizenship, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 233;
Martha Fineman, Equality: Still Illusive after All These Years, in Gender Equality, supra n. 7, at 251; Martha
T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage Tax Reform, in Gender
Equality, supra n. 7, at 267.

54. Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 312 (6th ed., Aspen 2006); see also Kelly Snyder, All Names Are Not
Equal: Choice of Marital Surname and Equal Protection,30 Wash. U. J.L. & Policy 561, 563-564 (2009).

55. Dukeminier, supra n. 54, at 312; Snyder, supra n. 54, at 563.
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"women's liberation movement"). 56 We have sought to control our own property,57 to
8
work outside the home so we can enjoy economic independence,5 and to achieve
control over our reproductive decisions. 59 We have come a long way in winning this
control and achieving the autonomy of a model citizen in civic republican ideology.
However, Gender Equality reminds us about the limits of our autonomy and the
limits of autonomy as a paradigm for our rights. Women who choose to bear children,
and play an active role in raising those children, have found the workplace
unaccommodating to our choice, and we have suffered economically as a result. Far too
many women still lack autonomy altogether because they are victims of violence. We
need more than autonomy. We need active state intervention to protect us from this
violence, and we need positive rights to facilitate our integration into society as fully
participating citizens. Thus, the autonomy based theory of liberal individualism is simply
not adequate to give us what we need to achieve equality. We need the kind of support
from society that men have historically received from their mothers and wives. This
suggests the need for a more community-based theory of rights. 60 The most valuable
contribution of this book is that it prompts us to theorize what these rights should be,
using a different paradigm than the conventional approach to women's rights.
In this regard, I found the essays on social citizenship to be the most compelling
section of Gender Equality. In those essays, the authors illustrate why women's rights
must integrate principles of equality with economic rights. Economic and gender
subordination are linked in our society, which has long depended on the unpaid and
underpaid labor of women and justified that exploitation as either the natural state of
women or as resulting from women's choices.61 Arguably, we are owed substantial
economic benefits to compensate us for that labor.62 Unfortunately, the recent trend has
been towards the opposite. Welfare reform has taken away the safety net for women who
are now forced to take low wage, no benefit jobs without any opportunity for
advancement in order to survive. 6 3 Court decisions have gutted the right to organize into
unions,64 which have also historically served as a means of women's political and
economic empowerment. In order for women to achieve full citizenship, we must
advocate for economic policies that further economic equality in our society. Along with
freedom from violence, day care, a robust right to organize, healthcare reform, and other
measures to strengthen our weakened safety net are some of the most trenchant women's
56. See generally Ana M. Novoa, American Family Law: History - Whostory, 19 Chicano-Latino L. Rev.
265 (1998).
57. See Trevor S. Blake, You Get What You Pay For: A New Feminist Proposalfor Allocating Marital
Property upon Divorce, 4 Geo. J. Gender & L. 889 (2003).
58. JoEllen Lind, Symbols, Leaders, Practitioners:The First Women Professionals, 28 Val. U. L. Rev.
1327 (1994).
59. Pamela Bridgewater, Gonzales v. Carhart: Continuing the Class Critique of the Reproductive Rights
Doctrine andMovement, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 827 (2008).
60. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care about Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to Justify
Protectionof "Real" Workers, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 355 (2010).
61. See Fineman, supran. 53, at 258.
62. See generally id. at 263-264.
63. See generally McCluskey, supra n. 53, at 272-274.
64. See James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 Mich. L.
Rev. 518 (2004).
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rights issues.
Finally, Gender Equality invites the reader to consider the means by which women
can achieve the rights discussed in the book. At the outset, Rogers Smith reminds us that
courts have been unresponsive to citizenship based arguments for women's rights. 65 1
agree with Smith that those rights might more readily be obtained through the political
process.66 It would be interesting to consider the link between citizenship and advocacy
for citizenship-based rights from a theoretical perspective. After all, civic republicanism
entails an active citizenry, and political participation is an act of citizenship. Given the
link between citizenship and political participation, are citizenship rights by their nature
better suited for enforcement through politics instead of courts? There is good reason to
believe this is the case.67 Past experience shows us that we are not going to get these
rights from courts.68 As we move forward in our advocacy for women's rights, it is
essential that we exercise the citizenship rights that we do have in the political process to
achieve the economic rights that are a precondition for women to achieve full
citizenship.
In The BirthrightLottery, Ayelet Shachar analyzes the negative, exclusionary side
of citizenship. Shachar argues that birthright citizenship perpetuates the global inequality
between citizens of wealthy and underdeveloped countries. 69 The country in which one
is born is highly determinative of one's wealth, health, and welfare. 70 This is
dramatically illustrated by the fact that, daily, people from less wealthy nations are
literally dying to enter our country and benefit from our economic opportunities.7 1
Birthright citizenship also contributes to social and economic inequality within our
country because those immigrants that succeed in entering the physical borders are
blocked from many of the benefits that those of us who are U.S. citizens enjoy simply by
virtue of where we happened to be when we were born.72 Thus, according to Shachar,
birthright citizenship is problematic from two perspectives - it creates external barriers
through the process of exclusion and internal barriers to success within our society.73
The Birthright Lottery thus speaks to two developing strands of scholarship - those
considering the meaning of citizenship to global human rights, 74 and those discussing
75
citizenship as a paradigm for civil rights within the domestic realm. Shachar sounds a
cautionary note to those who would champion citizenship as a source of substantive
65. Rogers M. Smith, Gender at the Margins of Contemporary Constitutional Citizenship, in Gender
Equality, supra n. 7, at 25, 29.

66. Id. at 34-36.
67. 1discuss this issue in more detail in Rebecca E. Zietlow, Enforcing Equality: Congress, the Consitution,
and ProtectingIndividual Rights 160-168 (N.Y.U. Press 2006).

68.
69.
70.
71.
72,

Smith, supra n. 65, at 34-36.
Shachar, supra n. 5, at 21-22.
Id.at 21.
Id at 1-2.
Id at112-113.

73. Id at 3.

74. See e.g. Yishai Blank, Spheres of Citizenship, 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 411 (2007); Berta
Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol & Matthew Hawk, Travelling the Boundaries of Statelessness: Global Passports
and Citizenship, 52 Clev. St. L. Rev. 97 (2005).
75. See e.g. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1047 (1994); Rebecca E. Zietlow, CongressionalEnforcement of Civil Rights and Bingham's Theory of

Citizenship, 36 Akron L. Rev. 717 (2003).
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rights, but she does not reject that tradition altogether. Instead, she argues that we must
openly acknowledge the pitfalls of birthright citizenship and take affirmative steps to
ameliorate the inequality that it causes. 76
The ongoing political debate over immigration in our country generally presents
two diametrically opposed solutions to the problem of illegal immigration - make it
easier for illegal immigrants to become citizens or close the borders more tightly in order
to block illegal immigration altogether.7 7 The alternatives in the standard academic
debate over the problem of global inequality are even more starkly opposed. While some
argue that citizenship should be abolished altogether, 7 8 others argue that the only way to
stem the tide of illegal immigration with its attendant social problems is to reinforce the
restrictions imposed by citizenship and close the borders to immigration. 7 9 Shachar
illustrates why so many people from underdeveloped nations wish to leave their homes
and move to Europe, the United States, and other developed countries - the staggering
differences in wealth and opportunity that characterize those nations. Her statistics are
truly overwhelming.80 The location where a person is born can literally determine
whether she lives or dies, lives a comfortable life of plenty, or a life of desperation and
poverty. Moreover, in 97% of the world, one's citizenship is determined by the
circumstances of one's birth, either the location of one's birth82 (known as jus soli) or
the citizenship of one's parents (known as jus sanguinis).83 While naturalization is
possible in many countries, including the United States, it is an extremely difficult
process,84 and the demand for visas establishing a legal right to remain in the United
States and other developed countries far exceeds the availability of those visas.85 Thus,
birthright citizenship creates a barrier to the social and financial success of the vast
majority of people on our planet. 86
Because of the overwhelming financial implications of one's citizenship status,
Shachar proposes considering citizenship as a form of property and birthright citizenship
a manner of inheriting wealth. 87 Just as we tax the inheritance of wealth, Shachar
advocates for a global tax that would be paid by citizens of wealthier countries to those
who live in poverty stricken nations. The tax would be paid once in one's lifetime, and

76. Shachar, supra n. 5, at 3-4.
77. Compare Ryan D. Frei, Reforming US. Immigration Policy in an Era of Latin American Immigration:
The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1355 (2005) with Justin C. Glon,
"Good Fences Make Good Neighbors ": National Security and Terrorism-Time to Fence in Our Southern

Border, 15 Ind. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 349 (2005).
78. See e.g. Shachar, supra n. 5, at 46 (citing Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103

Ethics 48, 49 (1992)).
79. See e.g. id. at 49 (citing ControllingImmigration: A GlobalPerspective (Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L.

Martin & James F. Hollifield eds., Stanford U. Press 1994)).
80. See id at 24-27.

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. at 21.

Schachar, supra n. 5, at 7.
Id at 128-133.

85. Id at 82-83.
86. See generally id. at 83.

87. Id. at 85-87.
88. Schachar, supra n. 5, at 96-97.
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the obligations could be fulfilled by service in a developing nation.89 Shachar points out
the strong support for inheritance taxes in our liberal philosophical tradition. 90 She
argues that the basis for inheritance taxes - that the rich inherit wealth by chance and not
due to any effort on their part - applies equally well to the accident of birthright
citizenship. 9 1 Therefore, she believes that it may be possible to elicit support for a global
citizenship designed to diminish the global inequities caused by birthright citizenship. 92
Shachar also discusses the impact of birthright citizenship on domestic policy.
Here, she focuses primarily on the United States, where "all persons born or naturalized"
within U.S. jurisdiction are citizens. 9 3 Domestically, birthright citizenship suffers from
both over inclusion and under inclusion. 94 The theoretical justification for birthright
citizenship is that those who are born within a jurisdiction will have roots to that
jurisdiction. 9 5 The problem with the system is that it includes some people with no ties to
the jurisdiction and excludes far too many who have ties, even life-long ties, to that
jurisdiction.96 Thus, children of illegal immigrants who are born within the United States
are citizens, but those that are brought over as infants are not citizens.97 This is so
despite the fact that both have similar or identical ties to the country in which they live. 98
The division between citizens and non-citizens cannot be justified by principles of
democratic self-governance because non-citizens often are as involved in their
communities as are citizens. 99 Nonetheless, non-citizens are barred from political
participation and from receiving most public benefits. 10 0 To remedy this disconnect,
Shachar proposes an alternative approach to establishing citizenship - one that would
focus on the connections between the individual and her nation. 101 To establish
citizenship, one would have to establish ties with a country.102 Birth within that country
would be an important tie, but birth alone would not be determinative. 10 3 Residency,
employment, payment of taxes, and other forms of community involvement would be
relevant for establishing the right to become a citizen of the community in which one
lives.104 Shachar's approach would thus emphasize the connection between citizenship
and belonging. Establishing a real commitment to belong to a nation would establish
one's right to belong.
Shachar's solutions make sense from a logical perspective. However, it is difficult
to imagine a political landscape in which her proposals would be accepted, at least within
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 99.
Schachar, supra n. 5, at 89.
Id at 96-97.
Id. at 101.
Id at 116.
Id. at i12.
Schachar, supra n. 5, at 114.
Id at I19.
Id. at 17-120.
Id. at 114.
Id at 137.
Schachar, supra n. 5, at I11.
Id at 166-167.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id.at 167-168.
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the United States. Although wealthier nations clearly already feel at least somewhat
obligated to provide foreign aid to poor nations, that foreign aid has little political
support domestically and thus perennially lags far behind the need for that aid. Imposing
a tax on individuals would add an entire new personal dimension that would be strongly
resisted by many people in our nation. Moreover, the view of citizenship as a morally
neutral concept is pervasive. Notwithstanding Shachar's highly persuasive argument that
our luck largely determines our access to wealth, the "pull yourself up by your
bootstraps" belief in individual merit permeates our society, providing a philosophical
justification for the unwillingness of many to sacrifice on behalf of others. At the same
time, those in wealthier nations who believe that they are entitled to birthright citizenship
would likely resist changes in citizenship rules that could disadvantage their children and
grandchildren. Nonetheless, Shachar's book is valuable because it causes the reader to
question the conventional paradigm of citizenship as a neutral factor in the realm of
human rights law. Shachar is right on the mark when she argues that citizenship is an
essential resource with substantial market value. More importantly, birthright citizenship
is not a preordained characteristic of the natural order. Instead, it is a policy that
countries undertake with very real consequences for both insiders and outsiders in their
societies.
In conclusion, the authors of these books provide an important service by
questioning the paradigms on which our equality law is based, both domestically and
internationally. Given the deep rooted and epistemic nature of the problems discussed in
these works, this discussion is clearly necessary. Most importantly, these works cause the
reader to question the neutrality of the state and the general premises on which our
equality law is based. To root out this inequality, it will be necessary to take affirmative
measures to counteract the numerous ways in which our seemingly neutral laws reinforce
the power of the "haves" at the expense of the "have nots." Finally, these books remind
the reader that real progress does not come without a struggle, nor is litigation alone
sufficient to create real social change. For advocates of equal rights, then, the next step is
to determine how to build a political movement to effectuate this change.
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